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NOTE AND COMMENT
Tar: P£RMANSNT INT£RNATIONAr. CoURT oii JusT1cr:.-For the first time
in history leading powers both great and small have been able to agree upon
a plan for an international court of justice. The plan was formulated last
summer by an advisory committee of jurists sitting at The Hague. Since
then it has been submitted to the Council and the Assembly of the League
of Nations and has been approved. It will come into operation as soon as
the project has been ratified by a majority of the nations belonging to the
League.1
The Pern1anent Court of International Justice, as it is called, will be
more than a mere panel from which arbitration tribunals may be constituted
from time to time, and it will be much less than a supreme court of the world.
It will t>e more than a mere panel of arbitrators because it is to be a permanent institution established to develop and apply rules of law. It will
1 The text of the project with a commentary by J. B. Scott may be found in
Pamphlet No. 35 recently issued by the Division of International Law of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Other data taken from current periodicals and
press reports.
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be less than a supreme court because, as approved by the League, it is to
have no obligatory jurisdiction. The draft-scheme provides for organization,
competence, and procedure. The procedure is to be very simple and in general much like the system already developed in arbitrations at The Hague.
There will be written proceedings, consisting of the submission of cases,
counter-cases, and, if necessary, replies, and also oral proceedings consisting
of the hearing of witnesses, experts, agents, and counsel. Details of procedure are wisely left to be settled by the Court itself. Decisions are to be
made by majority vote; the judgment must state the reasons upon which
it is based; dissenting judges may have the fact of their dissent, but not
their reasons, recorded in the judgment.
The matter of competence is more important. It was readily agreed
that the Court should decide cases submitted by the parties under general or
special convention. It was also agreed that in the absence of general or
special convention, jurisdiction should be limited to disputes of a justiciable
nature between states which the states themselves are unable to settle by
diplomacy. Should jurisdiction within these limits be obligatory or voluntary? The· advisory committee recommended obligatory jurisdiction in all
controversies of a legal nature involving (a) the interpretation of a treaty,
(b) any question of international law, (c) the existence of any fact which,
if established, would constitute a bre~ch of an international obligation, (d)
the nature or extent of reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation, and (e) the interpretation of a sentence passed by the
Court. The recommendation was well received by the smaller nations. It
was opposed by the great powers, however, and the project was finally
approved with the obligatory feature eliminated. The five categories provide
an admirable enumeration of the kinds of controversy which the Court is
specially qualified to decide, but the submission of such controversies remains
optional with the parties. The Court is to apply, in the order named,
treaties, custom, general principles of law common to all civilized peoples,
and the judicial decisions and juristic writings of the various nations. It is
also required to give advisory opinions on questions referred to it by the
League Council or Assembly.
The real difficulty, and one which threatened to prove insuperable, was
the problem of the Court's composition. There are great powers and small
powers, strong powers and weak powers, powers which ~re advanced in the
civilization which is characteristic of the twentieth century and others which
are backward. The great powers will never submit to any tribunal dominated by the small, weak, and backward. The lesser powers know all too
well the dangers that inhere in the predominance of the great. How may
a trib'unal be constituted among the fifty or more nations of the eartlT which
will satisfy the strong, safeguard the weak, be fairly representative,. and yet
be small enough to function as a court? This problem prevented agreement
upon a plan before the werld war. It threatened to disrupt the advisory
committee in 1920. The committee's membership was divided equally betwetn
nationals of great and small powers. Members from the more powerful
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states contended for permanent representation on the proposed court for
the great powers. Members from the smaller states insisted upon equality.
Elihu Root, in what may some day be regarded as the crowning achievement
of his career, piloted the committee to a satisfactory compromise. Taking
advantage of the existing League organization, and ably seconded by Lord
Phillimore, Mr. Root proposed a small court elected by the concurrent vote
of the League Council, in which the great powers are dominant, and the
~eague Assembly, in which all powers are represented equally. This proposal was accepted and became the basis for the plan eventually adopted.
The Court will consist at the outset of fifteen members, eleven judges
and four deputy judges. The members are to be elected from a list of can·
didates nominated by the national groups which constitute the panel of the
so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration. Each national group may nomi·
nate two candidates. If the Council and Assembly fail to agree on fifteen
members after three sittings, a small conference committee, called a Committee of Mediation, will attempt to agree upon candidates to be recommended for the unfilled positions. If this does not result in an election, the
members already elected to the Court may fill the vacancies by selection
from among the candidates who have received votes in either the Coundl
or the Assembly. Election is for nine years and members are eligible for
reelection. While national political office is declared incompatible with a
position on the Court, it seems to have been the opinion of the advisory
committee that this should not disqualify members of national courts or
legislative bodies. If a state which is party to a controversy submitted to
the Court has no national on the Court, it is assured the right to name a
judge who shall sie during the trial and disposition of that particular controversy. The Court will sit at The Hague.
The plan naturally makes a few concessions to the civil law countries
for which the justification is none too obvious to lawyers trained in a different system. There are several features which seem open to criticism,
notably the provision which makes French the sole official language and the
method of nominating candidates. These, however, are after all secondary
matters which may be amended as experience suggests. "The project on the
whole is a remarkable one and one that 9-oes credit to the sagacity and statesmanship of the jurists who labored on the advisory committee. This project
alone, it is believed, would more than justify the retention of the existing
organization of the League.
'
E. D. D.
Pruce REGULATION BY TH:€ STATE AND !N'r€RSTAT:€ CoMM€RCE.-The litigation which has resulted from a recent attempt of the State of Indiana to
regulate the price of coal should lead to a determination of the extent of
three important but very general principles of police power. The first and
most important of these, from the point of view of this discussion, is that
the State has the power to regulate returns of businesses "affected with a
public interest." In the first attack upon the Indiana law, it was held that
the business of mining and selling coal under existing economic conditions
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was within this class.1 At this time, the commission created by the act had
not entered upon the performance of its duties and several questions arising
under sections of the bill concerning these duties were deemed premature.
These sections, however, and subsequent orders of the commission pursuant
thereto, have raised: the question as to the extent of the remaining principles
referred to. The first of these is that the State may do whatever is reasonably necessary to render effective a valid exercise of the police power. The
other is. that an otherwise valid exercise of the police power may he sustained, despite the fact that it incidentally interferes with interstate commerce, in the absence of conflicting Federal legislation. The language in
which these principles have been stated in numerous cases, literally applied,
would sustain the provisions of the Indiana law under discussion. It may
be conceded at once, however, that they have never been applied to a situation closely analogous to that which arises under the coal law.
In order to prevent reducing to a nullity the power to -regulate prices,
the law attempts to insure an available supply of coal at the prices fixed by
empowering the commission to apportion among the operators the amount
necessary for domestic purposes, except for manufacturing, and to require
each to produce and offer for sale each month his proportion of the whole,
with forfeiture of the license provided for by the act as a penalty for disqbeying the orders of the commission, and a severe penalty for mining coal
without a license. The validity of this portion of the act was successfully
attacked in Vandalia Coal Co. v. The Special Coal and Food Commission of
Indiana,• the District Court of the United States for the district of Indiana
holding that these sections of the act constituted a direct interference with
interstate commerce, inasmuch as coal severed from the ground becomes an
article of commerce and the owner of the commodity has a right, so far as
the State is concerned, to sell and to contract to sell his entire output to
citizens of other States, and that this right cannot be interfered with by
compelling the sale of a certain amount in the State. The court also indicated that, aside from the interstate commerce question, the State has no
power to compel the production and sale of coal by imposing the alternative
of quitting business.
Before the principle relating to interstate commerce can become involved,
there must obviously be an otherwise valid exercise of the police power
which affects interstate commerce incidentally. So here, the question as to
the validity of compulsory production and sale, enforced through the alternative of compelling a cessation of the business of mining, must be determined in favor of the State before it becomes worth while to consider the
effect on interstate commerce. In view of the evident purpose of these
sections of the act to make price regulation a benefit rather than a detriment to the people of the State, their validity would seem to depend on the
application of the second principle: whether they can be said to be reasonably necessary to make effective a valid exercise of the police power.
1 American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, - Fed. - C. Ind., Sept. 6th, 1920). Discussed in 19 ll!xcn. L. REY. 74.
• - - Fed. - - (D. C. Ind., Nov. 27th, 1920).
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Examples of the applications of this principle which seem to bear directly
upon the present problem are to be found in the cases of New York ex rel.
Sil:: v. Hesterburg," and Sligli v. Kirkie:ood! In the former, a law providing
a punishment for the possession of imported game during the closed season
was held valid in order to protect the local game, admittedly a valid exercise
of the police power. In the latter, a Florida statute prohibiting the shipment
of unripe citrus fruits out of the State, in order to protect the citrus fruit
industry of the State, was upheld. These cases illustrate the principle.
Conceding that the business of mining and selling coal is "affected with a
public interest,'' so that prices may be regulated," the valid exercise of the
police power exists. To sustain these measures, it must be shown that they
are reasonably necessary in order to render price regulation effective. It
requires little imagination to predict the result of a measure providing
merely for the regulation of the price of coal, with no means of compelling
the sale of coal at that price. Coal in the particular State would simply disappear from the market, either going to States where the seller is not compelled to accept reasonable prices for his product, or, wh~re possible, being
stored until the iaw is recognized as an economic impossibility, and prices,
of necessity, rise to their old level. Nearly three hundred years ago Parliament pas"Sed a law" providing for the regulation of the price of coal in
London, and included the following remedy for an anticipated result: "And
if any ingrosser or retailer of such coal shall refuse to sell as aforesaid,
that then the said Lord Mayor and aldermen and justices· of peace respectively are hereby authorized: to appoint and impower such officer or officers
or other persons as they shall think fit to enter into any wharf or other
place where such coals are stored up ; and in case of refusal taking a constable to force entrance, and the said coals to sell or cause to be sold at
such rates as the said Lord Mayor and aldermen and justices respectively
shall judge reasonable, rendering to such ingrosser or retailer the money
for which the said coals shall be so sold, necessary charges being deducted."
Certainly there is some ground to support the conclusion of the legislature
as expressed in the act, that the measures are reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment! of the principal purpose of the act, and the Supreme Court
has said,' "If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such a statute,
then we may declare this one void, because in excess of the legislative power
of the State. But if it could, we must presume it did."
If the requirement of compulsory production and offer for sale, enforced
through the alternative previously referred to, can be sustained under this
principle, a power of the State, valueless alone, becomes valuable, and the
State has a means of protecting its people from extortion on the part of
• 211

• 237
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power of the
• 16 & 17

31,

52.

purpose of this discussion, it is assumed throughout that the first case
law was correctly decided and that the Supreme Court will affirm the
State to regulate the price of coal.
CAR. II, c. 2 (1661). Also 2 W. & M., c. 7 (1690), and 7 & 8. WM, III,

c. 36, (1696).
• )lunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. n3; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769.
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those controlling the supply of a necessity. Is the part of the power which
makes the whole worth utilizing, being sustainable as an exercise of the
police power, to be rendered invalid because the entire production of coal
within the State cannot be shipped in interstate commerce if the act is
enforced, without subjecting the operators to the penalty of retiring? The
only principle which seems to offer any hope for the act is the third of those
already referred to, that an otherwise valid use of the police power is not
invalid although it interferes with interstate commerce, provided the interference is incidental and there is no Federal law conflicting.
The basis upon which the legislature proceeds is a recognition in the
act" that the coal deposits of the State are sufficient to supply all legitimate
demands of intra- and interstate commerce for decades to come, and any
in~ention of prohibiting the sale or transportation of coal in interstate commerce is disavowed. The evil which the law seeks to combat is not the
shortage of supply, but extortionate charges. The purpose is not that the
State should obtain a larger supply of its coal than before, at the expense of
other States, but that the regulation of prices may not become futile by
driving the commodity away from the local markets. The interference is
incidental, therefore, at least in the sense that it is not the primary purpose
of the act.
Moreover, if the statement of the legislature concerning the deposits of
the State is to be taken at face value; the quantum of interference may not
be great. It is easily conceivable that in many instances individual operators
might be unable· to dispose of their entire output in interstate commerce,
however much they might .desire to do so. However, there may be numerous other cases where the operator could dispose of his entire production
in interstate commerce if he were free to do so. Here there would be an
undoubted interference.
What is the meaning of the term "incidental" as used in cases where
the principle has been laid down? The cases in which some form of the
proposition has been stated are innumerable, but few of them are of any
value in the present discussion, and none is closely analogous. Two very
small groups of cases approach the question from opposite sides, but there
is a ·wide gap between, and somewhere in that gap lies the solution of this
problem. In the one group are such cases as Geer v. Connecticut;• New York
er rel. Silz v. Hesterburg, supra; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,10 and
Sligh v. Kirkwood, supra. In the other are West v. Kansas NatHral Gas
Co.;u Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.;D Corwin v. Indiana, etc., Mining
Co.," and perhaps Leisy v. Hardin" and Scholle11burger v. Penna."
8

Act Creating a Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, Section ro.

"r61 U. S. 6rg.
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.:ZOI) U. S. 341>•
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NOTE AND COMMENT
Geer v. Connecticut and New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterburg deal with
statutes enacted for the protection of game, a valid exercise of the police
power. In; the first case, a statute forbidding the shipping of game out of
the State during certain seasons of the year was sustained. The second has
already been discussed. In both the objection was made that the statutes
directly interfered with interstate commerce. In both the statutes were sustained because the interference was held to be incidental.
In Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, a New Jersey statute forbidding the
piping of water out: of the State was sustained as a valid exercise of the
police power and an incidental interference with interstate commerce. In
Sligh v. Kirkwood, a Florida statute already discussed was sustained on the
ground thatl the protection of the citrus fruit industry of the State was a
valid exercise of the police power and that the interference with interstate
commerce was incidental.
All of these can be differentiated from the case of coat_. The game and
water cases can be distinguished on the ground that the owner in both cases
has but a qualified property right. Sligh v. Kirkwood can be differentiated
on the ground that it is within the power of the State to say that unripe fruit
is not a legitimate article of commerce.
A discussion of West v. Kansas Natitral Gas Co. sufficiently covers the
principle for which the other group stands. The State of Oklahoma had
passed an act prohibiting the piping of oil and gas out of the State for the
purpose of conserving the supply for its own people. The Supreme Court
of the United States held (three justices dissenting) that the act was a direct
interference with interstate commerce and invalid. The following propositions were quoted with approval: "No State, by the exercise of, or by the
refusal to exercise, any or all of its powers, may prevent or unreasonably
burden interstate commerce within its borders in any sound article thereof.
No State, by the exercise of, or by the refusal to exercise, any or all of its
powers, may substantially discriminate against or directly regulate interstate
commerce or the right to carry it on." This case limits the principle upon
which the coat law depends. However advantageous it may be to the people
of a State to retain within its borders a natural resource, it cannot be done.
Between the two _groups of cases there seems to be a wide gap, and ~t is
believed that the Indiana law will fall somewhere within that gap. In order
to be iustained it must be differentiated from the second group of cases.
Two distinctions at once suggest themselves. The primary purpose of the
Oklahoma law was to prohibit the exportation of the resource. The primary
purpose of !the Indiana law is to make price regulation a benefit and not a
detriment to the people of the State. Then, too, there is an obvious distinction in the quantum of the interference. The Oklahoma interference was
complete. The Indiana interference may be very slight.
In New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterburg, Justice Day distinguished the
case at bar from Scliolleuburger v. Penna., where a law prohibiting the importation of oleomargarine, a legitimate article of commerce, was held invalid,
though for the purpose of protecting the welfare of the people of the State,
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on the ground that in the latter case the interference was the direct purpose
of the act, whereas in the former the purpose was the protection of the local
game and the interference was incidental. The language of the court, both
in this case and in Sligh v. Kirkwood, seems to indicate that the term incidental refers, not to the quanfum of the interference, but to the primary
purpose. If this is the test to be applied, the Indiana law is clearly distinguishable from the Oklahoma law. From the legalistic standpoint, the question would seem to be rather doubtful, with no case directly in point or very
close. Language is to be found in the two widely divergent groups of cases
which mark the bounds within which the question falls, tending to support
the law on the one hand and perhaps to declare it invalid on ·the other.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court found sufficient merit in the Oklahoma law
to result in a split, there would seem to be at lea.?t a fighting chance for the
Indiana law.
On the economic side, the case for the law may be summed up as fol..:
lows : The starting point is: The State has the power to regulate the price
of coal. In the absence of regulation a certain amount of coal is being supplied to the people of the State at extortionate prices. If the same amount
of coal can be obtained at the reasonable price set by the State, the people
will be greatly benefited and: the people of adjoining States will not be harmed.
If coal cannot be obtained at the price set by the State, the law will, of
course, be extremely detrimental. P~ovided the State is to have the power
of regulating prices at all, and provided it confines itself to the necessities
of the case, why should it not be able to interfere with interstate commerce
to that extent. The principle that an otherwise ·valid exercise of the police
power can be sustained, though it incidentally interferes with interstate
commerce developed when the conception of the police power was confined
to health, morals and safety. Since then the police power has developed
considerably beyond that conception. Logically, it follows that the principles which developed in the early conceptio~ of the.police power and furthered the effectiveness of its exercise should not stand· still, but should be
extended into new fields when the necessity arises.
A. W. B.
Vor.uN'l'ARY PAROI. TRUS'l' WI'l'H IMPI.Ir;D Powi;:R OF Ri;:vocATION.-In the
recent case of Rnssell!s E~ecutors v. Passmore, 103 S. E. 652, in the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, it appeared that the donor had made a voluntary transfer of certain bank stock about six months before his death. Several years later, the donee having died without making any disposition of
the stock, the donor's infant children brought suit in the name of their guardian against the donee's executors to establish an alleged secret parol trust
of the stock. There were two reputable witnesses who knew something
about the transaction. One of them, who was present and participated in
the initial transfer of the stock, testified that the stock was to be held "in
the event of the donor's death" for the benefit of the donor's eldest son. The
other witness, who was the donor's administrator and was present at his
death, testified that the donor said a few hours before his death that the
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stock was held by the donee for the benefit of the donor·s children. There
was also testimony by an employee of the dance that the donee had said a
few months before his death that he had some money for the donor's children. And it appeared that on three occasions prior to his death the donee
had made remittances for the donor's children. On the strength of this evidence, the court held that the original transfer was an executed gift in trust
for the oldest son, that this gift was conditioned by an implied· power of
revocation, and that the original trust was later partially revoked and a
different and enlarged trust created for the benefit of a11 the children.
The implied power of revocation in this case must be supported solely
by the testimony of the witness who participated in the initial transfer. The
donor's declaration a few hours before death, remittances made by the
donee under circumstances which tended to indicate that they were intended
for a11 the children and the employee's testimony as to the donee's admission
a few months before death are a11 inadmissible to· show such an implied
power. They may be admitted to show that the stock continued to be held
in trust, or that the original trust, if ·revocable, had been revoked and another
created in its stead. But they are inadmissible to show that the initial transfer was intended to be revocable under the settled principle of evidence that
statements made by the transferrer, after transfer of title, are not receivable
as admissions against the transferee. Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, I95 N. Y. 433;
2 WIGMORE ON Ev1n£NCE, § Io85. It must be asEumed, therefore, that a
power of revocation was implied in reliance upon the testimony that the
stock was to be held "in the event of the donor's death" for the benefit of
the eldest son. The opinion makes it reasonably clear that the revocability
of the original trust was based upon this. testimony.
As a general rule, a trust once completely and validly created, whether
by a simple declaration of trust or by transfer in trust, and whether gratuitous or for consideration, cannot be revoked unless a power of revocation
has been reserved. Viney v. Abbott, I09 Mass. 300; Eu>ing v. Warner, 47
Minn. 446; I PERRY ON TRusTs [6th ed.], § 104 There seems, however, to
have been a slight reaction at some points from the liberality with which
voluntary trusts were formerly enforced. Fo11owing E~ parte Pye, JS Ves.
I40, there was at _first an inclination to tor~ure imperfect gifts into declarations of trust and enforce them as such. Morgan v. 'Malleson, 10 Eq. 475.
But this inclination was soon repudiated, and it became well settled that an
imperfect gift will not be given effect as a declaration of trust. Cardo:Ja v.
Leveroni., 233 Mass. 310; ScoTT's CAs:ES ON TRUSTS, I5I, note. In a few
instances voluntary trusts which are formally perfect have been held revocable. In the so-catted savings bank trust cases, instead of regarding a
deposit in a savings bank in the depositor's name in trust for another as an
irrevocable trust, courts have frequently treated it as a tentative trust or
trust with implied power of revocation. fo re Totten, I79 N. Y. 112; Walso
v. Lattemcr, 143 Minn. 364; 4 MINN. L. Rsv. 56. See ScoTT's CAS£S ON TRUSTS,
224, note. Compare Ca::alis v. Ingraham., no Atl. (Me.) 359; I9 MICH. L.
REv. 356. This anomalous result seems to be justified, however, if it can
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be justified at ·all, by factors which are more or less peculiar to savings bank
deposits in trust. See Beaver v. Beaver, II7 N. Y. 421, 430-r. Voluntary
transfers in trust have been treated as revocable in a number of cases.
There have been cases of voluntary settlement or gift in trust without express
power of revocation in which the court has seemed to place upon the beneficiary the burden of proving that the donor intended to make the gift irrevocable. See Couts v. Acworth, 8 Eq. 558; Everitt v. Everitt, 10 Eq. 405;
Garsney v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243; Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528. These cases
were cases of unusual hardship, however, in which the donor might have
been relieve4 without recourse to so dubious a principle. Compare Massey
v. Huntington, n8 Ill. 8o. It has sometimes been said that the omission
from a voluntary disposition in trust of a clause reserving a power of revocation raises a presumption that it was omitted by mistake. See Russelfs
Appeal, 75 Pa. 26g; Aylsworth v. Whitcomb, I2 R. I. 298. But such statements are believed to be unsound on principle and opposed to the weight of
authority. See Sands v. Old Colons Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575; Souverbvc
v. Arden, I Johns. Ch. 240.
It may be urged, of course, with some plaui:ibility, that the evidence in
the instant case, although meager, indicated more than anything else an
intention to make a gift in tn1st for the eldest son at the donor's death ip.
case the donor died without revoki1,1g. This construction appeals to the
present writer as a very dubious one. ·Why imply a power of revocation in
an executed gift to one to be held "in the event of the donor's death" in
trust for another? Nothing is more certain than death. The qualifying
clause is an appropriate way of indicating the time at which the beneficiary's
interest is to commence. Why attribute to it any greater significance? Compai:e Massey v. Huntington, n8 Ill. 80; Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300.
Probably the case should be viewed as another manifestation of a somewhat
curious reluctance to commit irrevocably one who has made a volunt2ry
declaration or transfer in trust. So regarded the principle of the decision
seems clearly objectionable. The only authority cited by the Court, Sterling
v. Wilkinson, 83 Va. 791, was really a case of imperfect gift which the court
could not perfect after the donor's death, and anything said about implied
power of revocation seems to have been mere dictum. Everyone would
agree at the present day that equity has taken a sound position in refusing
to give effect to imperfect gifts. But has not the pendulum swung too far
when revocability is implied as readily as in the instant case? It would be
unfortunate if pawnship equity should be permitted to impair the stability
of gifts in trust.
R. E G.
ANmALs-DAMAGJO;s DY T!msPASSING CHICKl!Ns.-P alleged he had a
large feed barn, filled with grain, and a garden with growing vegetables, on
his lot surrounded by a lawful fence four and one-half feet high, over which
some of D's 400 chickens crossed from her adjoining lot, and destroyed grain
and vegetable& to the value of $6oo. The trial court sustained D's demurrer.
Reversed. Adams Bros. v. Clark (1920), - Ky.-, 224 S. W. 1?46.

NOTE AND COMMENT
The court says: "By the common law of England the owner of domestic animals, including fowls, was required to keep them on his own premises, and was liable for their trespass on the lands of another." This common
law, as it was in 1007 (4 James 1), was the common ·1aw of Virginia, and
later, when the State of Kentucky was formed, by constitutional provision
became the common law of that state.
The court also said that while a statute provided "no recovery could be
had for the destruction of property [by trespassing animals], unless it was
surrounded by a fence four and one-half feet high, so close that cattle could
not creep through," applied to cattle, and had not changed the common law
as to fowls. Also, that the storing of grain on P's premises was not an
attractive nuisance and an invitation to D's chickens to enter and eat thereof.
A pathetic argument was made on behalf of the chicken owner that she
was -trying to bring down the high cost of living for her family. by engaging
in the chicken industry. The court, however, thought the plaintiff's efforts
to bring down the high cost of living of his family by raising garden truck
was equally commendable, and he should not be expected to feed his neighbor•s chickens also.
The court cites several cases involving horses, cattle, and hogs. The
only fowl cases cited are State v. Bmner (1887), III Ind. <}3, to the effect
that a fowl is an animal within the statutes relating to cruelty to animals;
and McP!ierso1i v. James (1896), 6g Ill. App. 337, holding that the owner of
turkeys is liable for damages in trespass on a neighbor's unfenced property,
although not for a penalty for allowing them to stray, under statute naming
certain domestic animals, but not turkeys.
That a fowl is an animal within cruelty and similar statutes is generally
held. Holcomb v. Van .Zylen (1913), 174 Mich. 274, Ann. Cas. 1915 A 1241,
with note.
There are very few cases holding that the owners of trespassing fowls
are liable for the damages they do; most of the cases are those holding that
the person on whose property they trespass has no right to kill them. JC1!inson v. Patterso1i (1840), 14 Conn. l (poisoning trespassing chickens, defendant liable); Matthews v. Fiestel (1853), 2 E. D. Smith, N. Y. go (poisoning
trespassing geese); Clark v. Kelilier (1871), 107 Mass. 4o6, 409 (no right
to kill trespassing chickens); Reis v. Stratton (1887), 23 nt. App. 314; State
v. Porter (18g3), II2 N. C. 887 (killing trespassing pigeons is cruelty to
animals) ; State v. Neal (18g7), 120 N. C. 613 (trespassing chickens could
be impounded at common law, and needlessly killing them is cruelty to animals); James v. Tindall (1913), 27 Del. 413.
In Taylor v. Gra11ger (1896), 19 R. I. 410, it was held that case instead
of trespass was the proper action where a city negligently atlowed the pigeons
from one of its parks to fly over and defile plaintiff's premises and annoy
him by the noise. In Lapp v. Staiito1i (19n), u6 Md. 197, an allegation in
an action of trespass that defendant's game chickens continually trespassed
on plaintiff's premises, roosted in his shed and on his new wagons and plows,
etc., to his damage, was held to be sufficient on demurrer.
·
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It was early held in Missouri, Iowa, and many other states that the
common law relating to trespassing cattle was not suited to their condition,
and was not in force in those states. Gormcm v. Pacific R., 26 Mo. 441; Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Ia. 3g6. In such states there are fencing statutes that affect
the subject materially. See note 3, BL. Coi.rn:. 2n [Lewis's Ed.].
In Evans v. McLalin (1915), 189 Mo. App. 310, where a farmer's chickens were alleged to have trespassed and destroyed a neighbor's crops, a
demurrer was sustained, and the owner of the chickens was held not liable.
This is based on the statute, and although directly in conflict with the principal case, admits the common law to be as ruled in that case.
In Keil v. Wright (1907), 135 Ia. 383, an injunction was asked against
the owner of chickens which repeatedly trespassed on plaintiff's premises
and destroyed his crops. The defendant denied the facts, and claimed that,
since he was solvent, an action at law would be an adequate remedy. The
trial court found for the plaintiff and granted the injunction. In the supreme
court the defendant, in argument, urged that "chickens were commoners"
and had a right to roam at will without being considered trespassers. The
court refused to rule on, this, since it was not pleaded nor considered by the
trial court, and so affirmed the decision of that court. Six years later, in
Kimple v. Seba.fer (1913), 161 Ia. 659, relying on the Keil case, plaintiff
asked an injunction to ·restrain the defendant from permitting his 200- chickens to trespass on plaintiff's land and .eat the oats he had planted there to
such an extent that he was obliged to resow it two or three times. The
defendant pleaded that "chickens were free commoners, and that the owners
of cultivated land must fence against them.''; that plaintiff had no lawful
fence enclosing his land; and that his remedy, if any, was impounding or
suing for damages. The court, by Deemer, ]., affirms the Keil case and
holds that an injunction will lie to prevent domestic animals from trespassing. He also says that at common law the owner must keep his domestic
animals at home; that trespass would lie for failure to do so; that the animals could be impounded; that these rules were early held inapplicable in
Iowa; that the matter was now regulated by statute, in reference to several
kinds of domestic animals ; that nothing had been done as to chickens, except
in cities, indicating that i11J the country chickens are free commoners, and
they, turkeys, ducks, geese, peacocks, and guinea hens have been so considered from the beginning of the state; that it is much easier to fence poultry
out than to fence it in; and that until the legislature made it obligatory the
court would not adopt a rule requiring the owner to fence them in, nor
enjoin him from permitting them to escape.
In all these cases it is assumed that the common law allowed an action
for damages, or distress damage feasant, for injuries done by trespassing
domestic animals. This is undoubtedly true as to horses, cattle, sheep, and
hogs. Yet by the laws of Ine (c. 69o), if a ceorl's close "be unfenced and
his neighbor's cattle stray in through his own gap, he shall have nothing
from the cattle; let him drive it out and bear the damage; but if there be
a beast which breaks hedges and goes in everywhere, and he who owns it
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will not or cannot restrain it, let him who finds it in his field take it out
and slay it, and let the owner take its skin and flesh, and forfeit the rest."
Lt. 40, 42. The Welsh law was similar. I THoRPJ>'s ANC!SNT LAWS AND
INST. 127.
In the year books of Ed. II (1307-1326) there are numerous cases of
replevin for cattle taken damage feasant, indicating that it was a common
remedy at that time; and in Boyden- v. Alspath (13o8), Y. B. 2 Ed. II, 87,
pl. 29, a trespassing ferret might be taken damage feasant; also a greyhound.
De la More v. Thwi11g (13o8), Y. B. 2 Ed. II, 176, pl. !)Sa. In 1481, Y. B.
20 Ed. IV, fo. 1ob, where D had common in 200 acres of land adjoining P's
land, and D's beasts entered P's unenclosed land without D's knowledge,
being driven there by wild dogs, and did damage, Brian, C. J., and Littleton,
J., held D was liable in trespass for the damage done, and the fact that the
wild dogs chased the cattle there made no difference. A hundred years later
the law was stated the same, relying on this case. Dyer, 372, pl. 10 (1581).
It seems the law has been thus since that time as to trespassing cattle, those
dangerous to crop&. There seem to be no chicken cases in England.
In the Welsh law above referred to it was said : "The owner must make
his garden so strong that beasts cannot break into it; and if it be broken
into there can be no redress, except for the trespass of poultry and geese.''
I THORP£, 127, note.
In Boulton's Case (1597), 5 Co. 1046, it was stated that one was not
liable for making a dove-cot from which the pigeons trespassed on the neighbor's land. This, however, was said to be contrary to Y. B. 4 H. VI, pl. 10,
and 27 Ass., pl. 6; and in Dewell v. Smiders (1619), Cro. Jae. 492, 79 Eng.
Rep. 41g, Doderidge, Croke, and Houghton, ]J., agreed that if pigeons come
upon my land I may kill them, and the owner has no remedy. Montague, J.,
held contra, for the owner has a property in the pigeons. In Taylor v.
Ne--..vman (1863), 4 B. & S. 89, 122 Eng. Rep. 343, the Dewell case was
affirmed. And in Webb v. ;'lfrFeai (1878), 22 Jour. Juris. (Sc.) 66g, the
owner of a carrier pigeon was held to have no remedy when it was killed
by D's cat, both the pigeon and the cat trespassing on neutral ground at the
time. So in McDonald v. Godfrey (18go), 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 142, the plaintiff
had no remedy for the killing of his canary, on his own premises_. by the
defendant's trespassing cat.
On the other hand, in Ferrer v. Nelson (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 258, Pollock,
J., held that one was liable in case for overstocking his land with 1,500
pheasants so that 300 of them trespassed on plaintiff's premises and injured
his crops. In Hadwell v. RightC1n (1907), 76 L. J. (K. B.) 891, where a
bicyclist was injured by a fowl flying into his wheel, in the road, the court
seemed to think that the owner of the chicken might have been liable if it
had been trespassing at the time.
In Boulton's Case, above, it was held that overstocking D's ground with
rabbits, which strayed on P's premises and did damage, did not make D
liable, for P might kill them. This is contrary to the Ferrer case, above.
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Compare Stearn v. Prentice (I9I8), 68 L. J. (K. B.) 422 (defendant not
liable for the depredations of rats harbored in his boneyard).
It is generally held that one is not liable for the mere trespass of his
dog, not known to be dangerous to persons ; ordinarily, of course, a dog is
not dangerous to crops. Brou>n v. Giles (I823), I Car. & P., 28 R.R. 76g;
Woolf v. Chalker (I862), 3I Conn. I2I, I28; Read v. Edwards (I864). I7
Com. B. N. S. 245; Sander v. Teape (IS84), Q. B., 5I L. T. N. S. 263;
Buchanan v. Sweet (I!)08), Io8 N. Y. S. 38; Van Etten v. Noyes (Igo8),
II2 N. Y: S. 888; Doyle v. Vance (I88o), 6 Viet. L. R. 87, contra.
Similar rulings have been made as to deer, Keilway, 30, Y. B. IO Hen.
VII, 6, pl. I2 (1495) ; Brady v. Warren [1900], 2 I. R. 632, 66I; State v.
Ward, I70 Ia. I85; and as to bees, Brown v. Eckes, I6o N. Y. S. 48g; Earl
v. Va1i Alstine (I858), 8 Barb. 630; O'Gorman v. O'Gorman [1903], 2 I. R.
573.
Of course, fowls may become a nuisance because of the dust, odor, or
noise they cause. Ireland v. Smith (I8g5), 3 Sc. L. T. Rep.-, 33 Scot L
R. 156; Desmond v. Smith, 9 Gm;r.N BAG, 550, 41 Sol. J. 167.
It is submitted the common law, as set forth in the principal case, should
be considered the correct rule, where damage is done by any such animals
in the exercise of their welt-known natural propensities, unless due to the
intervening act of God or the independent act of some third party, or similar
excuse. See "Responsibility at Common Law for Keeping Animals,"
THOMAS BJWEN, 22 HARV. L. Rr:v. 465; RoBsoN, ~SPASS BY ANIMALS.

H.L. W.
FuTURS INT~sTS IN RJ,:cENT STATUTES AND CAsts-REMAINDERS, DEVISES

Usr:s.-To the layman, or the beginner in the study of property law,
the intricat~ sinuosities of Shelley's Case and Archer's 'Case, of contingent
remainders and their destructibility, of indestructible executory devises and
uses, springing and shifting, seem inexplicable, incomprehensible, and useless-. But a longer estate than for the life of him who must perform the
feudal services on which his tenure rested is a concept that would have
seemed equally strange and impossible either to lay or legal mind when
feudalism was in fullest flower. Pure feudalism had no room for future
estates, but only for present holdings, based on present services, to be performed by the present tenant while he lived. An estate to A was not an
estate· for A to pass to another, either inter vivos or at death, hut to keep,
and only while he performed the personal services that went with it. When
estates to A and his heirs came to be recognized the concept was stilt of a
life estate to A, and "to his heirs" merely indicated that at the end' of A's life
the estate in natural course would go to him who should be his heir, and so
on: in indefinite succession. IS CoL. L. RJ,:v. 68o. ·
It was a sign that feudalism was already beginning to crumble when it
began to be suggested that an estate might be created carrying a present
interest in A and a future interest in his heirs, and the development of the
concept was a long process. It is more than possible that the rule in ShelAND
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ley's Case had never been if the first appearance of the principle now
known by that name (in 1324) had not preceded by more than a century
the recognition of the possibility of a destructible contingent remainder (in
1430). See Lord Macnaghten in Van Grutten v. Fo~ell [189i], App. Cas.
658. For if the remainder to the heirs of A in Shelley's Case had been
treated as a contingent remainder after A's death, and therefore destructible
by A in his life, free alienability by A would have been secured without
executing in him and adding to his life estate, as under the Rule in Shelley's
Case, the remainder expressly limited to his heirs.
But feudalism. and its fruits have long been gone. It might be supposed
that the reason for the law having ceased, the law itself would have disappeared. Quite otherwise. Indeed, Lord Macnaghten's remark in the case
referred to, that the subject "rarely comes up for discussion nowadays," is
not justified by an examination of the recent reports. They are full of
cases involving contingent remainders, Shelley's Case, Archers Case, etc.,
not merely in such a state as Illinois, where they are most exuberant and
intricate; Moore v. Reddel, 259 Ill. 36; Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hoppin, 214
Fed. 928 (a 1914 Illinois case), but in many other states as well. The cases
show we must say rather "the reason of the law having changed, the law
has changed also," but curiously enough, almost always by _statute, not by
court decision. And the statutes hark back to the old phrases and terminology and the old rules, so that one can understand the language of the new
rule only by a thorough study of the old cases. In England at least three
attempts have been made to do away with the frailty of contingent remainders, and not yet is it completely gone. A comprehensive statute was enacted
in 7 & 8 V1c::r., c. i6, s. 8, but it seems to have so affrighted the conveyancers,
see 30 HARV. L. REv. 227 ff., that it was repealed and a new statute enacted
the next year, 8 & 9 V1c::r., c. 1o6. This cured so little that thirty years later
the Contingent Remainders Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Vrc::r., c. 33, was enacted,
which partly restored 7 & 8 V1c::r., but left some cases unprotected.
We may compare a Massachusetts and an Illinois statute. The latter is
not free from references to "supposed rules," and to "double possibilities,"
a much talked of and utterly repudiated term, but it is comparatively simple,
and attempts in sweeping terms to resolve contingent remainders to present
day need·s, to make such a rule as we may suppose would have been adopted
' if defunct feudal institutions had never been. MASS. Giw. Ac:rs, 1916, 1o8,
provides that "a contingent remainder shall take effect, notwithstanding any
determination of the particular estate (Cf. 8 & 9 V1c::r., above), in the same
manner in which it would have taken effect if it had been an executory devise
or a springing or shifting use (Cf. 7 & 8 V1c::r., repealed by 8 & 9 V1c::r.),
and shall, as well as such limitations, be subject to the rule respecting remoteness known as the rule against perpetuities, exclusively of any other supposed rule respecting limitations to successive generations or double possibilities." How impossible an und·erstanding of the language of this statute,
without a knowledge of the ancient estates and their history I To one who
understands, the last clause shows an intent to bring the Massachusetts law
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to the position contended for by Professor Gray in his attack on Whitby v.
Mitchell, 42 Ch. 494. 44 Ch. 85, GRAY RUL£ AGAINST PJ;RPETUITI£S, Appendix
K, and the lively dispute there referred to between the author and Mr.
Charles Sweet, 30 HARV. L. Rsv. 226. The Massachusetts- statute in effect
abolishes contingent remainders, and resolves them, if they are limitations
in a will, to executory devises ; if in a deed, to springing or shifting uses.
They are thus transformed, supposedly in accordance with the intent of the
devisor or grantor, from d'estructible contingent remainders into indestructible devises or uses.• Freedom of alienation is preserved by subjecting them
to the same rule against perpetuities that was invented to check executory
devises and springing' and shifting uses, i. e., future estate& cannot be limited
to ·take effect beyond a life or lives in being and twenty-one years. This
common law period is the rule in Massachusetts. Millot v. Paine, 230 Mass.
514 (1918); Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass. 36i (1916). If this period is
too long to tie up land the remedy is for the legislature.
The Illinois statute referred to is Rsv. ST. 1874 c. 30, s. 6: "In cases
where, by the common law, any person or persons might hereafter become
seized, in fee tail, of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by virtue of
any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, hereafter to be made, or by any
other means whatsoever, such person or persons, instead' of being or becoming seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be and become
seized thereof, for his or her natural life only, and the remainder shall pass
in fee simple absolute to the person or persons to whom the estate would,
on the death of the first grantee, devisee or donee in tail, first pass, according
to the course of the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or
conveyance." Here again to one not steeped in the ancient law the language
is meaningless. Its labored language in terms of the law of the past required
the impossible. In Illinois primogeniture had been abrogated. Property could
not "pass according to the course of the common law" to the eldest son, but
must be distributed among all the heirs of the first taker. In I Ir.r.. L. Rsv.
322 ff., Mr. Kales has well pointed out that the court has made over the
statute by high-handed construction. Moore v. Riddel, 259 Ill. 36. As made
over, it ties up the land for one generation at least as the feudal lords in
vain tried to do by the Statute de Donis, for it gives a life estate to the first
taker, with remainder in fee to persons not born perhaps till near the death of
the life tenant. That makes it possible to tie up the Marshall Field estate
for possibly seventy-five years from the death of the owner, a serious clog
upon alienation in a country changing so fast as ours. There seems urgent
need of a shortened period for the rule against perpetuities, but so firmly
is the old law upon us that no courts and few statutes have cut down the
period. New York, followed by Michigan and some other states, has fixed
the limit at two lives in being. This has some things to commend it, though
Mr. Gray finds in the increase of litigation in New York serious objections.
GRAY, RUL.£ AGAINST P.£RP.£TUITm5, Sec. 749 ff.
The clumsy Illinois statute doubtless was intended merely to abolish
estates tail. This could have been done by giving to the life tenant an estate
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in fee simple absolute, or with contingent remainder over to the heirs. Twice
at least a fairly simple draft of a bill intended" to do that has been submitted
to the Illinois legislature, but the old law stands.
In the centuries old contest over future estates there have been two leading and conflicting ideas, intent and freedom of alienation, action and reaction on which have molded the law of future estates. To give effect to the
intent of the testator Lord Mansfield pronounced his famous, or infamous,
opinion in Perrin v. Blake, I W. Bl. 672, and precipitated the fierce and
humorous contest so entertainingly described in 3 CAMPBELL'S Liviis oF THE
Jus'l'xc:es, 305. In lesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh I, Lord Eldon emphasized freedom of alienation, and brought the rule back to a rule of law to be rigidly
applied, even though defeating intent. He assumed to regard the general as
distinguished from the particular intent, but would have done better to agree
with Lord Redesdale in sticking to the law defeating intent. As Cockburn,
C. J., put it in Jordan v. Adams, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 483, "the fatal words once
used" the law "inexorably and despotically fixes on the donor" all the consequences of bringing his provisions within the rule, "although, all the while,
it may be as clear as the sun at noonday that by such a construction the
intention of the testator is violated in every particular." As to contingent
remainders, the Massachusetts act very sensibly allows free play to intent
for a period by preserving them from the destruction that might have been
their fate at common law. Beyond that period the restrictions cannot operate;
indeed, the limitations must not try to tie up beyond, or they are void in
their inception. Such in a general way is the effect of the various provisions
of the Michigan statutes, C. I.,. 1915, c. 220, and of such a code as that oi
Georgia, CoD:e of 19n, Sixth Title, c. 3.
The importance of the ancient rules and the history of their development have been touched upon. The digests show how constantly cases are
before the courts, and seem to justify the statutes that have tried to modify
the rules to suit present day needs, for 111inois, which has refused to make
many changes, shows an unrest and dissatisfaction to such an extent as to
give color to the claim that she has as many cases as all the other states
together. The three latest bound volumes of the Illinois reports illustrate
the fact that under the old: rules one can hardly be sure what kind of a
future estate he has in hand until the supreme court has pronounced, not
once merely, but for the last time. Not only do the lawyers differ, which i~
to be expected if the opposing sides are to have counsel, and the judges disagree, which is not unusual, but the same court on consideration at different
times of the same instrument is not unlikely to reach different conclusions.
See, for example, Cutler v. Garber, 28g Ill. 200 (Oct., 1919), finding the
future interests to be executory, which in 26r 111. 378 had been held to be
contingent remainders. Under the Massachusetts statute this would have
made no difference. In 292 Ill. attention may be called to Cole v. Cole, in
which, at page 170, the old doctrine of destruction of contingent remainders
by merger is held to be still flourishing, and to Bender v. Bender, at page
363, where the contingent remainderman, there also a reversioner, is recog-
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nized as having an interest which he may protect by suit. This latter is
touched' upon in Die Bois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340, in which the court attacks as
though they were new in the state the property problems of the case, stating
in full the rule in Shelley's Case, defining remainders, and laying down the
law as to the destructibility of contingent remainders which has hardly been
doubted since C/mdleigh's Case, I Co. 12oa. In Gray v. Shinn, 293" Ill. 573
(June, 1920), the court feels called upon again to define contingent and
vested remainders, and announces the well-known fact that a contingent
remainder falls with the death of the life tenant before the vesting of the
remainder, page 579, as it would not if Illinois had the modem statute, and
Cf. Lewiti v. Bell, 285 Ill. 227. At 293 Ill. 581, it is pointed out that there
is no rule to prevent voluntary destruction of contingent remainders by a
conveyance for that express purpose by the life tenant to a third person to
bring about a merger. But shottld there not be such a rule, coupled with a
rule against ·remoteness? It is for the legislature to say. Litigants seem to
want it, for the interesting thing is not so much that the courts should again
and again restate these elementary matters as though they were new and
not centuries old, but that there should seem to be such repeated and persistent refusal to accept the rules. The court contents itself, as probably it
must, with a restatement of the oft stated rules. Change in a rule of property so long acted upon should ~e made by the legislature, and then not
retroactively, but Illinois refuses to Change, though curiously enough agitation there has been more insistent than elsewhere. See l ILL. t. Ri>v. 3u.
In addition to the above cases, see Sellers v. Rike, 292 Ill. 468, fully stating
the Rule in Shelley's Case and rigidly applying it, though it overrides intent.
Noth v. Noth, 292 Ill. 536, dealing with an executory devise and an expectancy; McBride v. Clepions (Ill., June, 1920), 128 N. E. 283, holding a limitation to be an executory devise anc:? indestructible, and not a destructible
contingent remainder; and Biwer v. Martin (Itt., October, 1920), 128 N. E.
518, applying the common law rule as to destruction of contingent remainders by merger, and the modified rule as to conveyance of such remainders
by way of an estoppel or r:elease. Cf. Kenwood Trust & Savings Bank v.
Palmer, 285 Ill. 552, holding a contingent remainder cannot be the subject
of sale, as it could be in Michigan and other states where it i9 alienable,
descendible and devisable. Graff v. Rankin, 250 Fed. 150, may be cited as
a recent case in which the Federal court applied the Illinois law to contingent remainders in a devise to one "Illinois Riggs and her lawful issue,"
with certain added limitations. Truly, this was an Illinois case, and the
peculiar thing about many of the above cases is that if the Illinois law had
been changed the questions in dispute would not have arisen.
In other states there still are, and no doubt always must be, cases on
future interests, even in those that have done most to square the law with
present day conditions and desires. Jn. Troll v. Tarbell (May, 1920), 127 N.
E. 541, the Massachusetts court construed interests as vested in preference
to contingent. The Michigan statute as to perpetuities had: to be construed
in Cary v. Toles, 210 Mich. 30 (April, 1920), and Woolfit v. Preston, 203
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Mich. 502 (Dec., 1918). The Michigan court is justified in its position in
In re Blodgett's Estate, 197 Mich. 455, that full force may be given to intent,
since the statute has relieved contingent remainders of their common law
infirmities, and by proper restrictions has protected the public against the
perpetuities that might result. The law favors vested estates, but will recognize others where the intent to create them is clear. It does not favor
joint tenancies, but nevertheless permits them. The language to create contingent remainders must, however, be plain and unambiguous. In re Shumway's Estate, 194 Mich. 245. That such language may be held by a trial judge
and by the Supreme Court to sho\v clearly two perfectly opposite things
appears in Colby v. Wortley, 205 Mich. 6og. Expectant estates having been
made descendible, devisable, and alienable, it matters less than formerly
whether estates are vested or contingent, but there are still vital distinctions.
This note is already too long to permit further detailed notice of cases.
The present importance in all jurisdictions of problems of future interests
is suggested by the following list of very recent cases which the curious may
examine. Alabama, Deremus v. Deremus, 85 So. 397 (Feb., 1920); Georgia,
Cock v. Lipsey, g6 S. E. 628 (Aug., 1918); Kansas, Moherman v. Anthony,
188 Pac. 434 (March, 1920); Maine, Real Estate, etc., Co. v. Dearborn., 109
Atl. 816 (April, 1920); Carver v. Wright, 109 Atl. 8g6 (May, 1920); Maryland, Hempel v. Hall, IIO Atl. 210 (Feb., 1920); Mississippi, City Savings
Bank, etc., v. Cortwright, 84 So. 136 (April, 1920); Missouri, Bramhall v.
Bramhall, 216 S. W. 766 (Dec., 1919) : Hartnett v. Langan, 222 S. W. 403
(June, 1920); Nebraska, Yates v. Yates, 178 N. W. 262 (June, 1920); New
York, In re Tift, l8o N. Y. S. 884 (Feb., 1920); Montague v. Curtis, 181 N.
Y. S. 709 (March, 1920); U. S. Trust Co. v. Perr~!, 183 N. Y. S. 426 (July,
1920); Ohio, In re Youtsey, 26o Fed. 423 (March, 1916); Oregon, Lee v.
Albro, 178 Pac. 784 (Feb., 1919) ; Pennsylvania, Berkley v. Berkle31, 109 Atl.
686 (Feb., 1920); In re McConnell's Estate, 109 Atl. 846 (Feb., 1920); In re
Groninger's Estate, no Atl. 465 (June, 1920); Rhode Island, Aldrich v.
Aldrich, no Atl. 626 (July, 1920); South Carolina, Home Bank v. Fox-, 102
S. E. 643 (March, 1920); Texas, Crist v. Morgan, 219 S. W. 276 (March,
1920); Virginia, Turner v. Monteiro, 103 S. E. 572 (June, 1920); Prince v.
Barham, 103 S. E, 626 (June, 1920).
This brief study justifies the claim that the common· law rules as to
future interests are quite inconsistent with the legislative policy of England
and the United States. Where the old rules have not been changed litigants
are constantly objecting. In the states that have changed most appears comparative quiet. The lesson, if lesson there be, is that statutes should give freedom to intent in creating futures estates, and preserving them when created,
but at the same time preserve freedom of alienation by cutting down, perhaps more than has yet been done, the period of perpetuities. With such
statutes the Rule in Shelley's Case, Clmdleigh's Case, P1irefoy v. Rogers,
and the rest, could be filed away as curios, and the law of real property and
modem needs and desires could dwell together in harmony.
E. C. G.

